The Underrated, Part II

Well, I have some free time and wanted to offer a few more names into the discussion, mostly do I could point out that, thus far, there has been no discussion. You guys need to step it up and add a comment or two, it's good practice for next season and coming up with your own hypotheses is the only way to get ahead of the rest of your league. Think about it like this--if everyone has access to the same information, and you fail to expand upon that information, you have no chance at a competitive edge. Granted, posting your original thoughts nullifies the innovation... but, we don't have enough readers (yet) to make that a major concern.

• Cliff Lee: 12 (unlisted)
  
• Justin Duchscherer: 38 (unlisted)
  
• Ryan Dempster: 39 (209)
  
• Rich Harden: 50 (187)
  
• Ervin Santana: 55 (unlisted)
  
• Edinson Volquez: 59 (unlisted)
  
• Mike Mussina: 78 (unlisted)
  
• John Danks: 91 (unlisted)
  
• Armando Galarraga: 94 (unlisted)
  
• Joe Saunders: 99 (unlisted)
  

Yes, this means that you could field a seven man rotation of Cliff Lee, Justin Duchscherer, Ervin Santana, Edinson Volquez, Mike Mussina, John Danks, and Joe Saunders without investing a single draft pick. Anyone notice anything in common among these guys. I'll start the conversation with the idea of "post-hype sleepers" but it doesn't describe everyone.

The Underrated

Here goes... Every year someone comes out of nowhere to lead fantasy baseball squads to the top of their league. Those of us in competitive leagues know that the Josh Hamilton's of the world are probably hyped names come draft day, representing the Funstonian "sleeper" of the year. If you drafted Hamilton (or counterdrafted him, as Pete did in both leagues we share, only to realize how much he should listen to me), you are probably having a fine season. But there are other names that somehow slip in the draft boards only to provide a ton of value off the waiver wire. I would like to list all the guys I think are underrated, and later in the week we will try to explain why each of us has given such players the cold shoulder at some point. Some of these guys continue to be underappreciated, while a few have been touted, though few to the real talent that they've displayed thus far.

• Carlos Quentin: 6 (unlisted)
• Ryan Ludwick: 8 (unlisted)
• Kevin Youkilis: 20 (177)
• Aubrey Huff: 22 (unlisted)
• Dustin Pedroia: 29 (168)
• Nate McClouth: 30 (192)
• Xavier Nady: 51 (185)
• Melvin Mora: 57 (unlisted)
• Mark Reynolds: 61 (unlisted)
• Milton Bradley: 69 (227)
• Jorge Cantu: 71 (unlisted)
• Randy Winn: 87 (220)

The first number represents the players current rank, while the second is their average draft position ("unlisted" implies they weren't drafted in enough leagues to make the cut as far as ESPN was concerned). I think I notice some obvious similarities between a number of the players, but I'd like to see you're thoughts first. Comment away, and I'll join the discussion once I feel I can bias the direction.

Wisdom of Crowds: WE WANT YOUR COMMENTS

So, a couple of weeks ago, I wrote this article trying to explain the modern economic idea of the wisdom of crowds. I don't know how well I did, but in brief, here's what I was getting at:

A large group of people is consistently smarter than any of its individual members. This phenomenon occurs because everyone has information, some public and some private, some good and some bad. When you get a large enough group of people (and one that's fairly diverse - this is extremely important), everyone's bad information begins to cancel out, and you are left with only the good information. Think of it like this. I am a teacher having a jelly-bean counting contest. The people who under-guess and the people who over-guess even each other out, so if I add up everyone's guesses and take an average, it will be closer than the guess of any individual, including the kid who knows the volume of the can and the size of each jelly bean and builds a spatial model. This may seem intuitive, it may not; either way, it works consistently in the real world. Check it out if you don't believe me.

Anyway, I write that trying to encourage you to comment, especially now that we are trying to make a good set of positional rankings. Why? As smart as Zach and I are (we're the nerds measuring the volume of the jelly-bean jar), we only know so much. You, dear readers, have information that can help us. More importantly, it will help every other reader of this blog, who will in turn help you. Brandon Funston's Big Board is fun, but it's only one man's opinion. We're trying to make a board that takes every man's thoughts, because we believe such a board will give a better indication of who will do what for the rest of the season. If you'd like (let us know by commenting), we will figure out a way to track our performances against Funston's, to test the theory that many men are smarter than one.

Also, I mentioned that diversity was very important. I want to close by saying that, in my jelly bean example, the only reason a group of people gets an accurate guess is because some people under-guess while others over-guess. It is because of differing opinions that we get an accurate result. So if you disagree - if you're the one person who expects Justin Verlander to strike out 120 batters the rest of the year - say it! Tell us why! As much as we love people telling us we're right, it won't change our rankings at all. So tell us when we're wrong, have a little back-and-forth (we may have some information you didn't think about, as we saw with Pedro Martinez), or you may have a thought we didn't. Just remember, it's you that makes our rankings better for everyone by sharing your opinion with us. Keep the comments rolling and good luck as we start the second half. 

Information Aggregation: The Wisdom of Crowds

So I've been reviewing some modern economics in the past week, and remembered a topic I covered extensively in the fall. It's a theory called the wisdom of crowds. If you didn't guess by the name, the theory states that if you take information from a lot of people and put it together, everyone's bad information will cancel out (with a large enough group) and you'll be left only with good information. Thus, crowds are smarter than any of their individual members. I can get into the details of this theory later, if anyone is interested.

I've juxtaposed this concept with the stuff I've been reading about man being in the Information Age. We face the problem of a crowd so large, with so much information, that there's no way to add up what everyone is saying. What I want to discuss, reader, is how you can take the ridiculous amount of information available in the fantasy blogosphere, and filter it down to what's truly useful for you.

First, I encourage you to visit many blogs each day. I do my best to check everything in our blogroll on a daily basis, because each individual is picking out different trends to spot and players to discuss. Taking information from each of these sites, each of whom might give me a slightly different outlook for David Ortiz for the rest of 2008, gives me a sound basis for deciding whether or not I need to move Ortiz for a low price today.

Second, I advise you to cross-reference things from the large fantasy sites. For example, take Brandon Funston's Big Board. As much as I love Funston, who is a very talented fantasy analyst, he has a tendency to fall in love with certain players (Howie Kendrick, Nick Markakis) and give them too much respect, to the detriment of more deserving candidates. Cross his top 50 with, say, the first 50 of Sportsline's top 300, and the guys appearing on both lists are the true cream of the fantasy crop. This is most useful in March, when you're drafting and you have a thousand different players you could take with each pick.

Finally, I want to put in a soul-less plug. Please comment on the things you read! People learn more from a two-way conversation than they ever can from a one-way lecture or reading. I learn from your comments as much as you learn from my articles sometimes! So comment on the blogs you read. Go to fantasy message boards if you're not sure whether you need to sell on Nate McLouth. If you've having a problem, I guarantee that there are other fantasy players out there facing the same dilemma. 

This post is getting a little long, but I'd like to summarize things quickly. A group of people is consistently going to be smarter than any individual. The fantasy baseball community is a large group of people, and I'm just reminding you to do everything you can to get information from a lot of these people. Read a lot, check your sources, and most importantly, comment! Let everyone else take as much from you as you take from them. 

Opportunity Cost - Evaluating Your Transactions

Opportunity cost, one of the most important topics in economics, hasn't gotten enough press time yet, and I'd like to take a few minutes to discuss its relevance when deciding who to drop, trade, and hold as the season marches on. Opportunity cost is defined as "the best alternative given up when making a decision." Economists also say that opportunity cost is the decision-making cost - if the alternatives are better than what you currently have, you will choose them, regardless of how much you have invested in the past (remember that past investments are sunk costs; economists say that these do not matter). As we reach mid-May, people are beginning to ask questions such as "Should I drop Andy Pettitte?", "What should I do about Chipper Jones?", or "Is it worth it to wait on Nick Swisher?". I'm going to take a minute to address the opportunity costs in a couple of these situations.

The opportunity cost of holding a player such as Andy Pettitte will depend on your league. If you can drop him and get a player such as Andy Sonnanstine, well, the opportunity cost isn't very high (Sonnanstine has a lower WHIP and more wins, but a higher ERA and fewer K's). If the guy you're going to pick up isn't any better, why would you drop?

The opportunity cost of trading a player such as Jones is, obviously, keeping him (remember, opportunity cost is the best alternative to a decision). If you keep him, you're bearing an injury risk and a probable decline in performance because, let's be honest, he's not going to hit .400 at season's end. But he could still hit above .300 for the rest of the year. If you don't think you can get a guy who will hit .300 in exchange for Jones, you probably shouldn't trade him.

The opportunity cost of dropping a player such as Nick Swisher is the same as the opportunity cost of trading him. If you drop Swisher, your opportunity cost is a player eligible at 1B and in the outfield who always has a high OBP but hasn't shown power yet. If you could have dropped him to pick up Joey Votto, you wouldn't lose the position eligibility but you'd gain the stats. However, if you drop him to pick up Mike Jacobs, your opportunity cost is the lineup flexibility you'd gain by holding Swisher.

So remember, keep in mind your alternatives. If you're ever trying to rationalize dropping Pettitte for Sonnanstine, take a step back and look at what you can expect from them in the future (remember, picking up Sonnanstine doesn't give you credit for the complete game he already threw). 

Liquidity: How Trade-able is Your Team?

One economic concept we have yet to bring up is that of liquidity. An asset is considered liquid if it can be easily turned into cash (therefore, a checking account is more liquid than a savings account, because it's easier to withdraw money from an ATM than to go into a bank and get money from a savings account). In fantasy baseball, I would call players "liquid" if you can easily turn them into other players. What determines how easy it is to trade another player?

First is name recognition. Along with this is expectations. If a player has good name recognition, because of a long career, or high expectations, because they are widely written about among the fantasy community, they will be easier to trade. One great example of this would be Nick Markakis - last year, Brandon Funston (Yahoo! fantasy analyst) wrote about Markakis all year, and he was much easier to trade because of it. On the other hand, Alex Rios sticks out in my mind as a player who gets very little recognition and is actually harder to trade because of it.

Injury risk is another major factor. Age is a big part of this. I own Chipper Jones and David Wright in a ten-team league. Jones has been filling my utility spot, but unfortunately, he's not very liquid. The other players in the league know he's old (unlikely to have a career year) and an injury risk (already has a strained quad), so they're not willing to pick him up. Wright would be much more trade-able, but right now I'm not ready to pursue that option.

Finally, I would say position also affects liquidity. Catchers are very liquid, because if you don't own Russell Martin or Victor Martinez you could get a very tangible upgrade. Same with second base if you don't own Utley. However, I wouldn't consider first base very liquid at all. Someone who has David Ortiz is probably less likely to trade for Mark Teixeira because they just don't stand to gain all that much. Pitcher is probably the most liquid position - because everyone starts so many so regularly, every owner is looking to pick up more pitching.

Those are my main factors considering liquidity. I would use this analysis to target players that aren't liquid and see if the owner wants to play ball (the owner of Chipper Jones may be so surprised to get an offer for him that you can get him for cheap, for example). Do you think I missed any important factors concerning liquidity?

Satisfaction: Homing and Hearts

I hear a lot of people say things in drafts such as "Draft with your brain, not with your heart". I have to ask though, Why? I'm not about to lecture about how fantasy sports are just games, but what I will state is that people play fantasy sports for entertainment, and it is from this principle that we must economically analyze drafting with one's "heart".

Let's look at two of the main reasons players will overpay for someone, and earn that aforementioned accusation: They are either homing (drafting players from their home town or favorite teams too high) or simply putting too much faith in a player that they like. Fellow author here Pete Abbate, if given the opportunity to do so without ridicule, would have taken Guerrero about a round too soon. I myself have drafted teams with a first four picks including Soriano, Ramirez, and Lee (though I can't see why this is bad... but that might just be my cubbie blindness).

Still, if you think about it, how much satisfaction does homing give you? I live in Pittsburgh, so of course I don't home for Pirates, but as a Cubs fan grab up the Chicagoans faster than you can say Kosuke Fukudome. Still, I'd say that when the Cubs come to town, attending the games is about twice as enjoyable. I stand to lose about 20 dollars in the barely competitive leagues where I do home, and tickets are about 15 bucks but are worth $25 to me if I get to see my fantasy team win. I imagine this is the same for everyone.

Also, ignoring that player you "know" is going to have a 35 HR season no one is expecting can be devastating if he does. While performing a round or two beneath this projection (a.k.a. defining your pick as a reach) may hurt your team, it is nothing you can't make up, and having those players you like makes it more enjoyable to play the game and play catch up. Compare this to the scenario when you passed on him and he did exactly what you thought he would. The disappointment will likely affect your game play, and you will likely lament for most of the season. 

So if you were unfortunate enough not to be born in Boston where every player is worth drafting, trade for those Tom Gorzelanny's, Adam Jones's, Jeremy Hermida's, and Zack Greinke's a bit too aggressively (sorry Athletics fans, I can't professionally suggest drafting Jack Cust or Bobby Crosby. Next year though you should have plenty of former-Diamondbacks that are today only in the rough).

Prisoner's Dilemma

Probably the most rudimentary example of economic game theory stems from the story of the Prisoner's Dilemma. While it's the most rudimentary, it's a bit too long of a lesson for here, so if you have an interest I'll direct you over there. Either way, the implications of the theory are pretty obvious for our purposes.

In game theory, a unit can choose to either "cooperate" or "defect". If both players cooperate, the gain for each is "medium". If both defect, the gain for each is "small". Finally, if one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gains a lot while the cooperator gains nothing. Now consider this when applied to fantasy baseball, or any fantasy sport really...

• Cooperating: Making a relatively fair trade that helps both teams. This often involves trading surpluses for surpluses. As a side note, it's good to go into the season knowing at least a few members of the league, or at least arranging some trading partners during the draft. With the mentality of cooperating, you can draft value and worry less about need.

• Defecting: These are the trades when you've ripped someone off. Last year I traded a package centered around Delgado for a package centered around Wright. It was in May, and my team never looked back. Needless to say, these are the harder trades to pull off, but they are the trades that win you leagues.

How do you pull off the defect? Well, the issue is that, if your opponent defects, neither of you really gain anything, since no trade will be agreed upon. Rather, just like in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the other team must cooperate, believing that you too are making a fair deal. Are such trades unethical? Should a league veto the deal, even if both teams believe they are making a fair deal? And for the most entertaining--What was the greatest "defect" you've ever pulled off?

Surveying the Signals

It's about time we get back to what this site is really about--economics. Now, many of you Freakonomists should be very familiar with the concept of signaling; as a side note, if you haven't read Tyler Cowen's Discovering Your Inner Economist there is a great section on the topic. But how does the economic principle apply to fantasy baseball?

We live in an era where information is power. The more you can learn about your surroundings, the more competitive you will be, whether it be in a pick up game of basketball, at your office, or in your fantasy baseball league. Obviously, you know this,  because you're reading a rather new blog that takes a devoted league member to discover. And smaller sites like these give a peculiar advantage...

If this site has any worth at all (and it does, based on our overwhelming number of readers who don't seem to post, hint hint) it is because we offer a different spin than ESPN, Yahoo!, FoxSports, or even Rotoworld. The aforementioned list does provide valuable information, but it is, as an economist would put it, not a scarce commodity. This is to say that any competitive player will have read these websites, and hence information gained from them cannot give you an edge. So you've figured out the first step: Having access to the most information possible will let you make the most reasoned decision possible. If you had only read, say, ESPN, you would probably think differently about a number of players than you do now.

What I want to point out is that, while you have done your homework, your league mates probably haven't. Most people rely on the big sites, because, for the most part, its enough. And those sites often dislike the same players (as a general rule, they warn to stay away from injury risks--often leading to draft day steals that will win leagues). The other day I was reading about how bad of a pick Carlos Zambrano is. Last year the guy was arguably the fourth best pitcher, whereas he's now relegated to a second tier. Pundits are going so far as to call him unownable. These are the signals that you must learn to abuse.

Your ESPN reading league member will bite on most of the advice they here from major sites. When you read an article on, say, Rotoworld, consider it a signal that the insulted player is a buy low, or that the paraded player is a sell high. Use there loved websites against them, because "Fantasy Expert" is a funny title that doesn't mean all too much, and if you disagree with those Yahoo! writers you shouldn't hesitate to take advantage of the signals those sites send. It's a small edge, but getting unpopular players for nothing usually doesn't take too much

Sunk Costs are Sunk

One of the posters brought up Manny Ramirez last year, and it definitely deserves a post of its own. The phrase "sunk costs are sunk" is a catch-phrase of economics. Borrowing an example from freakonomics (albeit paraphrased and slightly amended)...

Say, you've purchased movie tickets ahead of time to a theater downtown. However, the night of the movie you are worn out and there's a Seinfeld marathon all night. Now, many would feel obligated to attend the theater, having already spent the recusant dough. The economist would argue that the greatest satisfaction at that point is independent of the cost of the movie tickets, since such costs are "sunk."

Now, let's say you drafted Manny Ramirez in the second round of last year's draft, and he's failing (flailing?) miserably at the plate. Do you bench him, drop him, trade him, or just start him every night with blind faith in the Red Sox. Well, unless you are from Boston, we can count that last one out. Regardless of how much you invested in the player, such investment is a sunk cost, and like an MLB team not named the Dodgers you should play the outfielder who will help you the most.

Now, what about the other options? I would recommend not dropping him by the following logic. While the cost of you using a roster spot is tangible, it is lower than the risk of someone else picking him up and the player returning to form. Last year alone I picked up Alex Rios and Paul Konerko, and should have won the league.

Finally, to the question of trading him. If it is early in the year, and he still has value for being drafted in the so-and-so round, do it. If you are getting what you put into him, and there's a risk he will be a bust, trades like that should help you over the course of a season. If it is late, and the player doesn't look like they will perform, trade them for above-marginal value. Otherwise, you might as well have dropped them, an action which will hurt you.

Closers: Part II

So, hopefully I've convinced you that a team's record isn't a crucial factor when considering a closer. While closer is the only position that will get you saves, the pitchers will contribute to every category, so peripherals must be considered. Also, a good closer will contribute to wins and strikeouts. For instance, Francisco Rodriguez had 46 more strikeouts than Trevor Hoffman, while J.J. Putz had 6 wins to Todd Jones's 1. A difference of this magnitude among starting pitchers regarding either category would be considered substantial, but fantasy analysts tend to ignore them when they look at closers.

What factors should you consider? Well, peripherals are very important, along with durability and bullpen competition. Since it doesn't hurt to consider, winningness of the team can at least separate two close competitors. Lets look at these categories, using Zips and PECOTA for statistics, to find some possible steals.

Peripherals: B.J. Ryan (ERA 2.08, WHIP 1.03), Joakim Soria (ERA 2.83, WHIP 1.07), Huston Street (ERA 2.92, WHIP 1.03), George Sherrill (ERA 3.00, WHIP 1.18)

• Soria and Street are bargains, while the other two will come up later. The big four all have a projected ERA under 3.00 - which guys don't? Valverde and Cordero to name a couple. Check fangraphs for the data.

Durability: Every year, roughly fifteen closers lose their job due to injury or breakdowns. Some guys to be aware of this year as injury risks are Percival (age), Borowski (age), Rivera (age), Hoffman (age), Saito (age), Papelbon (showed fatigue last year, Red Sox showed extreme caution), Street (injured last season, seems healthy), Ryan (coming off Tommy John a bit early), Soriano (consistent injury troubles), Lidge (already hurt), Wood (consistent injury history). 

• Of these guys, I trust Rivera, Hoffman, Street, and to a lesser extent Papelbon to beat the odds and play a full season. Everyone else will likely see at least 15 days on the DL.
  

Bullpen Condition: Closers lose the gig every year, sometimes even when they pitch a good season (look at Fuentes' overall season last year). 

• Borowski should lose his job to Rafael Betancourt. Saito will be threatened by Broxton, but I think should hold on. It could be interesting if Rivera struggles and Joba Chamberlain pitches like last year. I could see Gagne exploding, with either Salomon Torres or Derrick Turnbow filling in. C.J. Wilson might be pressed by recent import Kazuo Fukumori, who has pitched well this spring and could open camp as the closer (also, Guardado was at one point the speculated closer, and he does have the most experience of that pen). Finally, Kerry Wood will fight for the job all season from the likes of Bob Howry and Carlos Marmol--The Cubs tolerated Dempster last year so I think Wood's leash might be pretty long once he earns the spot.
• Closers get traded around the deadline every year. Beware of losing your saves from Joe Nathan, Chad Cordero, Kevin Gregg, and George Sherrill. Nathan is the least likely to move-though the Twins might feel forced to-and I can't see him not closing or on a competitive team that will need a closer barring injury. Also, beware that Soria may be tried as a starting pitcher.

Winningness: Referring to the first post, which teams will be new to the winners bracket (above .500 for our purposes) and the losers bracket? Nothing really new here,

• New Winning Teams - Tampa Bay
• New Losing Teams - Seattle 

So, who would I say is underrated heading into this season? Well, there isn't much to complain about among Francisco Rodriguez, who is in a walk year, and J.J. Putz (whose newly projected losers will still win 73 games). If you waited till the twelfth round in a ten team league (10th in a twelve team league) you'd still see respectable names-as in unblemished by the aforementioned considerations-such as Street, Corpas, Capps, and Isringhausen. All of these guys could serve as a number two closer or paired and accompanied by a riskier late round pick like Betancourt, Wood, or Ryan.

The most important factor thing to recognize is that having a solid bullpen will provide saves, but also contribute to other categories. Last year Francisco Cordero, Jason Isringhausen, and Jose Valverde-already their team's closer-went after the 120th pick. Other guys like Matt Capps, Joakim Soria, and Jeremy Accardo provided value from the waiver wire. If I had to pick this years "surprise three" it would be Street, Soria, and Ryan.

Grand Theft Roto

Often, ESPN runs a feature called Grand Theft Roto, where the writer picks out players that are overperforming or underperforming and says to either trade them for a farm or trade the farm. This is about as parallel to the stock market as we could get, but I figured it needed a little bit more objectivity...

This is the last time in awhile that I will bring up "tiers" from a purely strategic sense, but it warrants discussion. When is a player worth "selling high". Well, I would say that if a player is playing a tier above where you expect him to perform, you can gain marginal value. If he is performing better but still within his tier, you might want to simply hold. You likely won't gain a substantial bounty.

Secondly, when is a player worth "buying low". This one is more valuable, for if a player is performing a tier less than you project, get him. Most players return to their tier, and it's especially likely that a player will return to his norm if it's just a slump (watch injuries though).

What does it mean to "project a player isn't in the right tier"? Really, this is a gut instinct. If you ranked someone in a certain place during the offseason and they aren't living up to it, go after them unless you believe the underperforming version is the real player. Likewise, if a player is performing above what you thought, but you think that he will maintain that, don't trade him. Even if you turn out wrong, you will have done what you thought was right, and hence should be more satisfied. 

Why Quantize?

So why is using quantum baseball mechanics worthwhile? Well, your opinion of your team is a product of your satisfaction with the team; if you gain equal satisfaction from two players, then they are on the same tier, and any trading should only focus on gaining a player on a better tier. Giving away trade-fodder (MPs) to gain a player on the same tier will reduce your team to a position where it has either...

peaked: You cannot make any trade without giving up more than you are getting. Hence, your team cannot improve. The free agent market cannot provide improvement or trade fodder in this condition.

-or-

plundered: You have traded so many "2 for 1"s that your team consists largely of free agent gambles. The issue here isn't so much that you have a weak team, but that the league associates your pitching with the free agency, and hence there is little appeal to those players regardless of performance.

Hence, trade strategy should revolve around which of these conditions is more likely. A Tier 1 for Tier 2 + league minimum pitcher is fair, but it only worthwhile if you think someone will develop from free agency. In a competitive league--read "efficient market"--those free agent players should vanish quickly.

Quantum (Baseball) Mechanics

The following is a reprinted article from before Rotonomics worked with MLB Front Office. We here at the blog consider it beneficial reading to our new readers.

Ah, theoretical physics. I can't help but consider whether or not I'd have been up to a career in this field had I never become obsessed with fantasy baseball. But as that is a path long ago abandoned, I must instead integrate one particular idea into the dirt baseline of the fantasy world. Quantum mechanics involves the premise that all energy is divisible into quanta, the smallest form it can maintain. In Quantum Baseball Mechanics, this "smallest form" of value is what I call "minimum pitcher above free agency" (marginal pitcher or MP). It relies on the following condition: in every fantasy baseball league ever, every team is trying to improve their pitching core. A pitcher that is slightly better than free agency is likely sought by most every team, but it is the lowest valuable commodity in the realm of trades.

Now, marginal pitchers can be used to gage player values and team values. Often I see the phrase "tiers" applied to drafting strategies, but how do we determine which players belong in each tier. Let's define a "tier" as followed: If Player A is better than Player B so that the trade "Player A = Player B + 1 minimum pitcher above free agency", then Player A is one tier higher than Player B.

Lastly, marginal pitchers must be considered when evaluating your team. Each team's value can be determined by total "MPs", where the players are equal to the number of tiers they are over the best free agent player at that position. Hence, Utley is one tier above Phillips/Upton/Roberts, who is one tier above Cano, who is one tier above Kinsler/Kendrick/Weeks/etc., who are one tier better than free agency. Utley is worth "4 MPs" since each trade from the free agency would require a total of 4 league-minimum pitchers.

So, here's the question. What stats represent a "minimum pitcher above free agency"? I would say an ERA around 4.00, a WHIP around 1.35, and a K/9 around 6. Thoughts?

Team Need vs. Best Available Player

It's your turn, end of the fourth round, and for some reason Brian Roberts is on the board. You glance at your cheat sheet, and realize you've projected the future Cubs'--okay I'm not going to let that one go--second basemen to bat just under .300 and steal 50 bases-in other words, he's a steal this late in the draft (no pun intended, I did say "in other words" but I lied...).

However, you look at your team, and you already have Jose Reyes, Carl Crawford, and Russell Martin. Okay, okay, let's not even deal with such extremes. Instead, let's say you have Reyes: What should you do?

This is a classic example of team need vs. best available player, and I've heard many opinions of what constitutes a sound strategy. What I'd like to examine is many of the factors that you should weigh in your choice:

• Liquidity - This is an economics phrase that describes capital, which is a good way of looking at each of your selections. The most common argument for taking the best available player is that he has more value, but value is only "valuable" if you can move the player. In this situation, Roberts would gain value if you could trade him for a pick that went earlier; however, it is crucial to note that every pick before yours passed on the second basemen. At some point in the season, Roberts should yield plus value, but it will likely be long after the draft is fresh in your opponents' minds.
• Scarcity - I've heard so much about how speed should be drafted early because power can be found late in the draft. This is true to the extent that low average sluggers will likely stick around, but even those sluggers won't provide much more than 25 HRs (Luke Scott, Rick Ankiel, Jason Giambi). I'd rather draft power early and grab guys like Justin Upton, Willy Taveras, and Michael Bourne with those later picks. So, in the Team Need vs. B.A.P. dilemma, I'd bias my choice in favor of taking a high average slugger before a high average base stealer.
• Opportunity Cost - In economics, opportunity cost is derived from limited resources. In fantasy baseball, that resource is roster spots. Should a team with David Wright take Aramis Ramirez if his league mates fail to draft him before the team's fourth pick? In this case, I'd say yes, as the value (derived from scarcity and liquidity) outweighs even the steepest opportunity cost of a utility spot. With at least three outfield spots, the opportunity cost of an OF spot is less than any other offensive position.
• Marginality -  How much better is the player? A full round of ADP, or even the better part of one, should make the decision tough. If it is a few picks, you are trusting your cheat sheet too much - ADP is just that, an average. Because after the draft, the ADP become the DP, and this is what most owner's will correspond value to.

So there are the main principles in taking the better player even when your team would benefit from someone else. But remember, it is the best team that wins leagues, not the best bench. Compromising flexibility can diminish the utility of the free agency for your team, while leaving gaping holes in your roster sends a clear signal to other owners that they don't have to offer a fair deal to you. I don't want this to be an exhaustive list, because I hope to hear some takes from everyone else out there. 

How to Mock Draft

I have made the first step--I am no longer in denial. I have an addiction to fantasy baseball, and my fix during the offseason are mock drafts.

Okay, this is a little dramatic. But most of the people you will meet on the messaging board of the mock drafts will depict such a struggle. I have found a cure, or at least a way to minimize the symptoms. And it is one of the most important lessons of this blog.

When I first started mock drafting, I made the mistake of trusting fate. I would go in with no strategy save the players I wanted to target, grab them if someone else didn't first, and consider it a successful draft if my team looked good at the end. The problem is, every team looks good in February. During the voting period offered afterward, I've had the same pick chosen as my best and my worst, I've seen compliments and insults, and I've seen one team that I considered among the best voted as the worst. So what can you do?

Follow the scientific method. Come up with a strategy before hand, such as "wait as long as possible for pitching" or "ignore position scarcity" that will serve as your hypothesis. Follow that idea, and afterward look at your team. Is it as good as the one (or several) you drafted with the strategy "I love pitching" or "the team with Chase Utley wins"? If so, adopt that strategy, and go from there.

When I draft, I end up with what I feel is the best team (as do others via voting) consistently, so I know I'm prepared for this coming season. I still try to make slight changes; anything to give you another edge. But remember, go in with an idea, and follow it. If it made sense in the first place, it will probably help more than randomly drafting. Even if your strategy is "draft the best player available regardless of position" its enough to reflect on later. And once you know you've got a system that works, it helps with the addiction.

At least a little.